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Abstract 
Despite Mexico‟s progress in terms of democratization, the country‟s Broadcasting Law and 
its practices of granting broadcasting licenses still have not adapted to the principles of 
democratic citizenship. Community radios remain extra-legal operations: their legal status is 
not regulated and there is no transparent way to obtain licenses and resources. At the same 
time, prominent actors in the domains of politics and media support the criminalization of 
these alternative media. Nonetheless, community radios have organized and mobilized for 
legal recognition. As a result, 19 stations have obtained licenses and operate legally. The 
paper offers an assessment of the situation of Mexican community radio stations and traces 
the process of legalization of community radio from 2002 to 2010. It connects the question of 
media regulation with theoretical assumptions about the concept of defective democracies and 
the quality of democracy. A comparative perspective of other Latin American countries, 
which have largely modernized their regulation of community media, further complements 
the analysis of the Mexican situation. 
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In the past 30 years Latin America has witnessed major transformations of authoritarian 
regimes to modern mass democracies (what Samuel Huntington (1991) termed the “third 
wave of democratization”). Most of them have not consolidated, but have stabilized as lasting 
“defective” democracies (Merkel et al. 2003, Merkel 2004; Puhle 2005). The low steering 
capability of national governments and strong advocacy coalitions between legislators and 
dominant media industry have complicated and retarded reform processes aimed at more 
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pluralistic and democratic media regulation. In Mexico and other Latin American countries, 
community media have remained extra-legal operations and only recently has their striving 
for legal recognition blossomed into the first granting of permissions as well as progressive 
broadcasting reform initiatives. Mexico represents a prime case of an outlawed community 
media‟s struggle for legalization in a recently democratized polity. Because Mexico‟s 
transformation came by electoral reform and without exchange of political (party) elites, it is 
an incipient case of state renovation (reforma del estado) which has yet to consolidate a 
modern democratic system, ensure political efficacy and responsiveness, and generate 
legitimacy and trust among citizens. Legalizing community media and restructuring media 
legislation will be only one part of this endeavor. The negotiations over legal recognition of 
local and independent media illuminate the cleavages between elements of the ancien regime 
and progressive forces. 
 
 
Community Radios in Mexico: Il David electronic 
 
“Radios comunitarias” have been in existence in Mexico for more than 40 years. (For a 
detailed account: Calleja & Solís (2005)). Oftentimes these local mini-broadcasters, which are 
operated by committed, yet oftentimes uneducated activists in their own barrio, municipality 
or area, have evolved from radio stations started by Catholic missionaries and labor unions, 
which have existed since the 1950s in Latin America (one of the first being La Voz de los 
Mineros in Bolivia, 1952), and school radio stations, which were to bring literacy and 
education to far-off rural areas. The idea of free radios populares, non-profit and 
unsubsidized radio stations, broadcasting independently from state and market and emerging 
from social movements, regional ethnic groups or local communities, has been thriving since 
the 1980s in Latin America, just as in Europe and other regions. Today, community radios in 
Mexico reflect a broad variety of social actors and cannot be reduced to be servicing a rural, 
poor, indigenous and marginal population only. We also find urban stations, stations oriented 
toward young academics and those which also broadcast via Internet and reach global 
audiences, like the suburban station La Voladora, based in Amecameca near Mexico City or 
Radio Bemba FM in Hermosillo (Sonora). 
 
Since the 1990`s Mexico has undergone an accelerated liberalization process and a series of 
electoral reforms which were aimed at cleaning up its notoriously fraudulent elections and 
which opened the way for the first changes in government on local and regional level. The 
electoral victory of an opposition party (PAN) and its presidential candidate in 2000 marks 
the transition of the country from an authoritarian one-party system towards a three party 
(defective) democracy on its way to consolidation. Mexico‟s democratization process during 
the 1990s, but particularly the transition brought about by the government change in 2000, 
catalyzed the development of the community radio spectrum. Beside start-ups of new 
community stations in rural and more indigenous areas, urban stations thrived from student 
movements, universities, citizen-action groups, grassroots and other civil society activities. 
 
The total number of community radios in Mexico is unknown. The Mexican section of 
AMARC, the World Association of Community Radios, estimates the number to be in the 
thousands. Among these, however, are many religious stations, which AMARC does not 
recognize as true “radios comunitarias”. AMARC Mexico encompasses 27 member stations, 
including indigenous and campesino stations, as Radio Huayacocotla from Veracruz and 
Radio Calenda La Voz del Valle from the state of Oaxaca, as well as urban stations like Neza 
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Radio from one of Mexico City`s poorest and most crime-ridden neighborhoods, 
Nezahualcóyotl. 
 
Legally, none of these radio stations exist – except for 19 transmitters, which were granted a 
broadcasting license between 2004 and 2010 - an intermediate victory in the struggle to 
legalize community radios in Mexico. The Broadcasting Law, dating from 1960, distinguishes 
only between state and private commercial media, providing no access, no regulation and no 
resources for independent broadcasters. While community radios were tolerated (or ignored) 
under the hegemonic rule of the PRI, the Christian-Conservative government of Vicente Fox 
started to close down stations after 2002. At the same time a reform initiative in the Senate, 
seeking to democratize Mexico‟s media system, intended to grant them full recognition as 
media actors by making a distinction between state and public broadcasters. This initiative, 
however, was never implemented. Until 2010, radios comunitarias did not represent a 
formally acknowledged legal entity, which prevents them from acquiring financial resources 
and being allotted space in the new digital broadcasting menus. Community radios in Mexico 
are versatile and pluralistic, but operate under clandestine and illegal conditions. However, the 
closing down of stations and the debates about reforming media legislation have stipulated the 
endeavor of community radios to bring their legal status onto the political agenda. 
 
Dominant Mexican media outlets, supported by political majorities, have opposed legal 
community radios, notwithstanding the extremely asymmetrical competition structure. Media 
concentration in Mexico is (along with Italy) the highest among OECD member states 
(www.sgi-network.org). While the TV market is dominated by two outlets, Televisa and 
TV Azteca, who together control and reach more than 95 per cent of available channels, 
audiences and resources, the radio market is more diverse. There are private 
commercial concessionaires and stations that have a “permiso” to broadcast – the latter 
consist mostly of state owned radios. Permisonarios are not allowed to obtain financial 
resources from advertising.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Radios with Permissions and Concessions in Mexico, 2008 
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Source: The Mexican National Chamber of the Radio and TV Industry CIRT 
(http://www.cirt.com.mx/cirt/estadisticas.html; Rev. 30.04.2010) 
 
 
About 70 per cent of all privately operated radio stations are owned by one of ten media 
conglomerates: Radiorama, Grupo ACIR, Radiocima, Organización Impulsora de Radio 
(OIR), Sociedad Mexicana de Radio (SOMER), Promosat de Mêxico, Radiodifusoras 
Asociadas (RASA), MVS Radio, Organización Radio Fórmula and Multimedias Estrellas 
de Oro (Gómez Garcìa & Sosa Plata 2009: 1062). Media concentration is one of the 
issues community radios seek to address, since state-operated broadcasters and 
commercial conglomerates leave hardly any space for independent outlets, as Radio 
Voladora exemplifies in their mission statement: 
 
 
 
“La Voladora Radio is a collective born in the year 2000, whose principal 
objective is to disturb the great conglomerates of communication, which 
centralize, commercialize and cannibalize the two most important common 
goods: information and speech (palabra).” 1 
 
This paper deals with the legislative conflict of legalizing community radios. With what 
strategies do Mexican community radios mobilize support, place their issue on the political 
agenda and campaign for legal recognition? Why is legal recognition important to them, with 
online broadcasting as an alternative point of access to the public sphere? And what are the 
arguments of political parties and politicians against legalization? Why do dominant media 
outlets oppose community radio? The objective here is to describe and analyze the situation of 
community media in Mexico and trace the legislative processes leading toward a more 
democratic regime of media regulation. The analysis is built on legal documents, press 
reports, reports from agents who actively participated in the negotiation processes, resources 
provided by AMARC (for both Mexico and the larger Latin America and Caribbean region), 
as well as semi-structured interviews from field research in Mexico. It largely builds on 
existing material, which is only accessible in Mexico and in Spanish language, thus intending 
to provide interpretation and a basis for academic debate on an issue that has so far been 
confined to Mexican stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
The Quality of Democracy and the Impact of Community Media 
 
Negotiations about community media‟s legal status, its entitlement to public funding and the 
free use of radio frequencies characteristically center around its vital role for democratic 
societies, the human right to communication, and its potential to foster cultural and linguistic 
pluralism. However, community radios are mostly operated on a non-professional basis; their 
reach rarely exceeds a few hundred or thousand households and covers primarily issues of 
                                               
1
 “La Voladora Radio es un colectivo nacido en el año 2000, cuyo principal objetivo es hacerle la mala 
sangre a los grandes consorcios de la comunicación que centralizan, comercializan y canibalizan dos bienes 
comunes de gran importancia: la información y la palabra.” 
 http://lavoladora.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=165&Itemid=90, Rev. 30.04.2010 
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low political salience for a national audience, because they are relevant for a local area or 
municipality only. Next to the dominant commercial operators and public/state radios, their 
impact may be no more than a „footnote‟ for national media systems. Why should states 
bother to draw up media regulation for these heterogeneous but marginal actors? This article 
argues that the legal status and the attitude of state institutions and government authorities 
with regard to community media serves as an indicator of the general openness of media 
regulators towards pluralism, the diversity of actors in the media system and democratic 
control of public communication. 
 
There is no hard-and-fast definition for what community media is, and what it is not. The 
most inclusive, but un-analytical definition includes every body that self-identifies as a 
“community medium”. A variety of texts, such as media laws, scholarly literature and 
activists‟ manifestoes, provide structural, functional and content-related criteria. According to 
these versions, community media is independent of state and market, non-profit, non-
professional, and local; it reflects local culture and traditions, is rooted within and represents 
ethnic, linguistic or social groups, serves as mouthpiece for new social movements, grassroots 
mobilizations or neighborhood initiatives; it airs non-mainstream music and alternative news 
and provides information that is relevant for a local area or community (Atton & Hamilton 
2008; Bailey et al. 2008; Couldry & Curran 2003a; Hamilton 2000). With some variation in 
emphasis, these are the criteria that are usually touted as core elements of community media. 
As such, today‟s understanding of community media transcends the classic “poor, marginal, 
rural” scheme and applies to urban subcultures and academic milieus. 
 
Manuel Castells (2009) has recently argued that power in the network state – a similar 
concept of what John Keane (2009) refers to as “monitory democracy” - means control over 
communication: 
 
“Power is more than communication, and communication is more than power. But 
power relies on the control of communication, as counterpower depends on breaking 
through such control. And mass communication, the communication that potentially 
reaches society at large, is shaped and managed by power relationships, rooted in the 
business of media and the politics of the state. Communication power is at the heart of 
the structure and dynamics of society.”2 
 
With regard to broadcasting, states have no choice but to control mass communication by 
regulation, because states own the radio electric spectrum and must set rules and conditions 
for granting access (licenses). Nation-states create, form and revise their media systems, 
which result from political decisions more than from technological development. Media 
legislation is the expression of state control over communication – and the emphasis which is 
given to state-operated, public, commercial and community media within the relevant laws 
reflect the priorities of those exerting power by controlling communication. Thus the role that 
is conceded to the weakest actor with the most limited bargaining potential can serve as an 
indicator of openness and democratic affiliation within these power structures: Who can, 
according to the provisions of media legislation, control communication – (1) the state; (2) the 
state and a commercial media industry; (3) the state, a commercial industry and civil society? 
 
Not surprisingly, control over communication is likely to be highly concentrated in 
authoritarian regimes, where the media is either state-operated, or, as in pre-transformation 
                                               
2 Castells 2009: 3 
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Mexico, the state transferred media operation to a co-opted and collusive private monopoly. 
In democratization processes, the decentralization of communicative power has to be re-
negotiated, as more actors seek to participate and information demands increase. Theories of 
democracy from Robert A. Dahl`s Poliarchy (1971) to recent discussions about the quality of 
democracy (Diamond & Morlino 2006) have underlined the importance of access to 
alternative information and a diversity of opinions in modern mass democracies. Transitions 
to democracy therefore inevitably lead to reform pressure on media legislation. 
 
Aside from normative demands of public communication for the consolidation and  - later – 
an assessment of the quality of democracy, the concept of “defective democracies”, that is 
derived from an ideal type of “embedded democracy” allows to trace the consequences of a 
public arena with limited access. The concept, developed by Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Juergen 
Puhle and others (Merkel et al. 2003, Merkel 2004, Puhle 2005), builds on the idea that 
democracy consists of five both independent and interdependent partial regimes, which are 
externally embedded in specific social-economic contexts, civil society and stateness.  
 
Table 2: The concept of Embedded Democracy 
 
(Source: Merkel et al. 2003: 50; Merkel 2004) 
 
This model goes well beyond a minimal understanding of democracy as “electoral 
democracy” that has its focus solely set on the functioning of a frequent, open and fair 
exchange of incumbent ruling elites by elections. It also addresses the problem that a large 
number of third-wave democracies have not yet consolidated, but have become rather stable 
“diminished subtypes” of democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1997). Thus, the model 
distinguishes a variety of defects according to the related partial regime and centers on the 
idea of lasting, not transitional, defective democracies. 
 
For our purpose it is the partial regime of political rights/public arena that is important. With 
regard to its operationalization, indicators addressing associational rights and freedom of 
expression/freedom of the press are suggested (Merkel et al. 2003: 84), including the legal 
framework of the public arena, economic independence (no monopolization of information 
flows) and operational freedom (no selective repression of actors or organizations). Thus, if 
access to the public arena is limited by politically motivated arbitrary and prohibitive policies 
(as a post-autocratic legacy), if public or private monopolies prevail and selective repression 
occurs without prosecution, the partial regime of political rights and public arena features 
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severe defects. This consequently leads to the illiberal type
3
 of a defective democracy, in 
which basic political and human rights of citizens are challenged, civil society is weakened 
and democratic consolidation protracted. 
 
Whether small and local media actors like community radios become legally acknowledged 
and are entitled to apply for broadcasting licenses in transparent, non-arbitrary and diversity-
enabling procedures is not a matter of “nice-to-have”, but a prerequisite for democratic media 
legislation and a central element of democratic quality. The treatment of community radios – 
enabling participatory communication on a local level or blocking whatever competition from 
entering the media markets – thus indicates the openness of media systems and the 
inclusiveness of public communication. 
 
 
Legalizing community radio in Mexico 
 
From the beginnings of the radio era until 2005, only one Mexican community radio station 
had been granted a legal license (Radio Teocelo in the state of Veracruz). The Broadcasting 
Law of 1960, which is still in force today, distinguished between “concessions” for 
commercial stations and “permisos” for official (state), cultural and experimental stations as 
well as radio schools intended to bring literacy to the country`s rural population. Practically, 
however, permissions were only granted to state ventures or radios associated with state 
institutions. Although the “eternal” autocratic regime of Mexico‟s hegemonic Party of the 
Institutionalized Revolution, PRI, which governed from 1929 to 2000, had opted for a 
commercial broadcasting model instead of governmental ownership, the regime sought to 
control mediated communication and keep actors that were not co-opted by the PRI out of the 
media system. The pact between the PRI and the national media, which granted considerable 
economic latitude and low levels of formal state intervention in exchange for affirmative 
media coverage and political allegiance, could hardly be controlled, if extended to civil 
society or community media. Unlike its predecessors, the 1960 Broadcasting Law did not 
contain open censorship provisions, but informal pressures remained, since the government 
could withdraw concessions and threatened to nationalize the media system: “Do not criticize 
the President of the republic, do not question the belief of the Mexican people in the Virgin of 
Guadalupe, and do not speak ill of the military.”4 (Mejía Barquera 1999: 25) It comes as no 
surprise that community media remained largely invisible during the PRI`s “perfect 
dictatorship” (Mario Vargas Llosa).  
 
With economic deregulation policies and increasing political liberalization from the mid-
1980s on, alternative radio stations gained attention and grew in number. The devastating 
earthquake of 1985 in the Mexico City region brought legitimacy and recognition to public 
and alternative radio transmitters, after Televisa`s antennae collapsed and more than 20 
million citizens found themselves reliant on non-commercial radio broadcasts for information 
in a desperate situation. Community radios – no numbers are available – remained clandestine 
and illegal operations. To cater to the communication needs of Mexico‟s rural and indigenous 
citizens, the Mexican government launched state-run “radios comunitarias” associated with 
                                               
3 The term „illiberal democracy“ does not refer to a paradox of a „democracy“ without political liberties and 
civil rights (as there is no democracy without these), but is used within the concept of embedded democracy to 
point at deficits in the partial regime of political liberties. Other types of democratic defects are exclusive 
democracies, delegative democracies and domain/tutelary democracies.  
4 No criticar al presidente de la Republica, no cuestionar la fe del pueblo mexicano en la Virgin de Guadalupe y 
no hablar mal del Ejercito. 
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the federal Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI)
5. Starting in 1979 with “La Voz de la 
Montana” in the state of Guerrero, today this decentralized institute runs 27 stations, 
transmitting programs in many of Mexico‟s 31 indigenous languages and focusing on issues 
related to community and tradition. 
 
Vicentes Fox„s historic victory and the end of the PRI`s hegemonic rule increased the number 
of community radio start-ups and started a legal debate about democratization, the demand for 
communication in a democratic polity. This development then exerted reform pressure on the 
new Christian-Conservative government. Permissions, however, were still not granted to 
community radios, as application procedures remained untransparent and arbitrary. In 2000, 
the relevant authority, the Ministry of Communication and Transport (Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes, SCT), requested one million pesos in trusteeship 
(fideicomiso) and a 52,000 peso security deposit as a guarantee that the applicant, Radio 
Habla Palabra from Sonora state, would not broadcast commercials or accept sponsors. Not 
only were these sums financially unattainable for small alternative stations, but the demand 
itself points to deficits in the rule of law in Mexico, as no law, decree or directive existed that 
justified the requested monetary deposits to obtain broadcasting permissions (more details and 
cases: (Calleja & Solís 2005: 82). 
 
Today, the rationale of community media legislation goes beyond democratization and a 
normative discussion of recognition. The convergence from analogue to digital broadcasting 
is exerting additional reform pressure on those transmitting without license: Once the 
analogue spectrum will no longer be used for broadcasting, clandestine radios will lose 
receivability. Their only option to continue broadcasting would be the internet: 
 
“Many social alternative groups keep on thinking in the old patterns of broadcasting. 
Community radios continue to think that they should be given a license to transmit 
analogue radio (…) and do not want to think of other forms of distribution. (…) Many 
people in rural areas have been carrying around portable radios for years, since more 
recently their CD Players and I am sure it is now their iPods. Why they are not 
thinking about these new forms of broadcasting – as of ignorance or because it is less 
romantic or less politically correct – I don‟t know.” 6 
 
This critique does apply to a number of community radios, although some do offer Podcasts 
and online transmissions (livestream). However, internet usage is still not common in a 
majority of Mexican households, but mostly confined to urban, educated audiences with 
higher incomes.
7
 It is still unlikely that Mexican community radios can reach their audiences 
via the internet. In combination with the demise of analogue broadcasting the pressure to gain 
legal access to the digital broadcasting spectrum and sufficient resources to master 
technological convergence increases. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 In 2003 INI has been renamed Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, CDI, www. 
cdi.gob.mx <Rev. 30.04.2010> 
6 Interview with Mexican media expert and scholar, 11 August 2006, transl. by author. 
7
 According to data from Asiciacón Mexicana de Internet, 29.7 per cent of Mexicans use the internet; 22.7 per 
cent of them live in urban regions (zonas urbanas). See http://estudios.amipci.org.mx:8080/mashboard/main.jsp, 
Rev. 20 April 2011. 
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Foreclosures and Non-Reform 2000-2006 
 
After 2002, the situation of Mexico‟s community radios changed dramatically. Having 
previously existed in a legal grey area between clandestinidad and acquiescence, their 
struggle for legalization and broadcasting permissions began with the forceful closing-down 
of stations on the one hand, and the advent of a reform project, which aimed at democratizing 
obsolete media regulations, on the other. In October 2003, more than 30 radio stations were 
shut down by SCT, and three more in December 2003. Police and military units were 
deployed in this operation, which included the confiscation of equipment. Other stations were 
threatened and bullied, both by state actors and anonymously.
8
 Commercial radio and TV 
enterprises took a hostile stance against community radios and pressured the government to 
end state toleration of extra-legal broadcasting activities. At the same time, a group of 
Senators around Christian-Conservative Javier Corral (PAN) reactivated the project to reform 
media legislation, which had come to a halt in 2002, when round table discussions between 
the Ministry of Communications and Transport, parliamentarians and actors from civil society 
and media organizations broke apart. Corral‟s initiative attempted (among other pressing 
issues) a legal acknowledgement of community media as “public media”, which the bill 
distinguished from “state media”.9 
 
The conflict around legalizing community radios peaked in the second semester of 2002 and 
2003 between 
- representatives of community radios, mainly AMARC, 
- state actors, mainly the Secretaria de Comunicacion y Transportes, SCT and the 
Secretaria de Gobernancion SEGOB, and 
- the pressure group of the commercial broadcasting industry, the Cámara Nacional 
de la Industria de Radio y Television, CIRT. 
 
In this situation, both commercial broadcasters and governmental actors criminalized 
community media and claimed that the World Association of Community Radios aimed at 
establishing “clandestine, pirate and guerilla radios”10 in Mexico:  
 
“We are fighting against stations that have neither concession nor permission, and we will 
not stop before every station that operates has a concession or permission, or else it won`t 
operate.” Jorge Alvares Huth, Subsecretario SCT11 
 
Alvares Huth, responsible for the closing down of community radios, had previously been 
employed by several Televisa enterprises and CIRT – the same institution which launched a 
campaign against community radios, sending open letters to the president requesting not a 
regulatory overhaul, but the foreclosure of all stations without license: 
 
                                               
8 See the Mexican daily newspaper El Universal, October 10, 2003, p. B7. Although the confiscation of technical 
equipment may seem inappropriate, the law covers the action: “El que sin concesion o permiso del Ejecutivo 
Federal opere o explote estaciones de radiodifusión, perderá en beneficio de la nación todos los bienes muebles 
o inmuebles dedicados a la operación o explotación de la estacion de que se trate.”, Art. 104 of the Radio and 
TV Law 
9 Art. 78-105, Dictamen de la Iniciativa de nueva Ley Federal de Radio y TV, January 3, 2005 
10
 See the daily newspaper La Jornada, March 29, 2003, p. 50 
11 “Estamos combatiendo  a las estaciones que no tienen concesión o permiso y no vamos a parar hasta que toda 
estación que opere tenga una concesión o permiso, y si no, que no opere.” El Universal, October 9, 2003, p. B7 
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The moment has come to raise a firm denunciation of the illegality and impunity, with 
which the self-denominated “community stations” – which they are not, but an expression 
of piracy that puts at risk Mexicans‟ rights and certitude.. Jorge Mendoza Garza, CIRT12 
 
Governmental authorities shared this assessment and opted for a criminalization of 
community radios, instead of opening regulation towards obtaining broadcasting permissions 
for stations that were neither state-operated, commercial nor indigenous: 
 
“I am sorry, but we will not talk to or defend criminals; as the authority in charge, we 
have the obligation to pursue offenses; asking for a solution to the issue of community 
radios would be as if someone committed a murder and asked the authorities to do nothing 
about it.” (SCT official, 2000)13 
 
The incentives of CIRT remain unclear. After all, the asymmetric competition between 
community media and the commercial media oligopoly could hardly have conjured a scenario 
of rivalry over audiences, resources or market shares. However, it seems plausible that CIRT 
anticipated that a legalization of community media combined with the beginnings of reform to 
media legislation could lead to a major caesura, opening the market for new competitors and 
lead to state subsidies for non-commercial media outlets. AMARC also localized the root of 
the antagonism from commercial broadcasters in the absence of regulations in the realm of 
economic competition: 
 
“The Mexican media system used to be so closed. (…) The issue is that if you let one 
more player enter, many more will follow. The central issue is how to preserve a 
number of players without anyone else entering – and the specific reason is (dividing 
the) cake of publicity revenues. The problem is that 100 per cent of publicity revenues 
go to the (two) television broadcasters. The central problem is that there are no rules 
of competition.”14 
 
The strategy of Mexican community radios in their struggle for legalization built on support 
from national and international civil society actors
15
 and international organizations
16
 and 
focused on communication as a human right, instead of arguing over the details of national 
regulation. Support also came from press journalists and actors from state broadcasting 
institutions, such as the Mexican Institute of Radio (IMER), a network of seven state-owned 
radio stations in Mexico-City. IMER opened a channel (that was previously reserved for the 
speaking clock service) for the Radio de las Ciudadanos. This station was founded to 
broadcast from the Festival of Community Radio, a rally for legalization in August 2002, in 
which 300 stations and more than 2,000 citizens participated, and later remained on air. 
                                               
12 “Es el momento de plantear una denuncia firme, sobre la ilegalidad e impunidad con la que actúan las 
autodenominadas “estaciones comunitarias”, que no son sino una expresión mas de la piratería que pone en 
riesgo los derechos y la certidumbre de los Mexicanos.”;  From a speech given at the annual banquet of the 
broadcasting industry with the Mexican President Vicente Fox; See the daily newspaper La Reforma, October 
10, 2003 (Reclaman empresarios sancionar la „piratería“) 
13 “Lo siento pero nosotros no podemos hablar ni defender a delincuentes, como autoridad tenemos la 
obligación de perseguir los ilícitos, pedir una solución al tema de las radios comunitarias seria tanto como que 
alguien cometiera un asesinato y se le pidiera a las autoridades no hacer nada.” Quoted in Calleja & Soliz 
2005: 70 
14 Interview with AMARC leading staff, 24 August 2006, transl. by the author. 
15
 Such as Asociación Mexicana por el Derecho a la Información (AMEDI) or Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y 
Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CMDPDH) 
16 Such as Inter-American Commission on Human Rights IACHR 
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Stakeholders and civil society actors embarked on a strategy with legal, political and mediated 
dimensions. Most important was the decision of how to frame their demand, not only in 
public communication but also with regard to addressing political decision-makers. They 
opted for the human rights frame: 
 
“We moved the topic from being only about access of media to being a problem of 
exercising human rights. (…) We moved it out of the realm of cultural policy. (…)You 
can disregard cultural problems, but if human rights are at stake, you cannot disregard 
that.”17 
 
Another strand of argument pointed to experiences from other Latin American countries, in 
which community radios have been legally acknowledged and regulation of community 
broadcasting has been reformed in the course of democratic transformation processes. The 
cases of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile and Argentina, where a variety of regulation models have 
been implemented that transcend the narrow approach of Mexican legislators and 
administration, illustrate the lack of regulatory creativity that predominates media policy in 
Mexico. 
 
The pressure from the commercial broadcasting industry on the one hand and international 
organizations on the other, led to a growing conflict within governmental institutions, which 
became obvious in the mediation meeting between SCT, AMARC, parliamentarians and 
media actors:
18
 While SCT joined an advocacy coalition with CIRT and demanded the closure 
of all community radios operating without permission, SEGOB was troubled by the 
prominence of the issue in the press. As the powerful ministry in charge of Mexico‟s internal 
affairs, SEGOB anticipated conflicts and high political costs from further closures. 
A hearing of Mexican AMARC representatives in front of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in Washington, DC in March 2004 amplified the international pressure on the 
recently democratized Mexican government and helped to recruit international NGOs, such as 
the Open Society Institute, to the cause. After SEGOB`s chief negotiator had been switched, 
both SCT and SEGOB agreed to an individual, case-by-case assessment. Despite this, in May 
2004, President Vicente Fox could still be heard to announce the closure of all “clandestine” 
radios at a meeting with the Broadcasting Industry‟s Union (STIRT),. An open letter by 
Mexican artists and writers Francisco Toledo, Carlos Fuentes, Carlos Monsivais and Juan 
Goytisolo addressed to President Fox supporting the legalization of community radios 
demonstrated the intensity with which the public debate had taken up among the cultural and 
political elites. 
Eleven stations of the AMARC network applied for a broadcasting permission after SCT 
(under pressure from SEGOB) explained, specified and modified the previously very 
untransparent application process.. Between December 6, 2004 and August 9, 2005 all of 
these applications were granted. By 2006 SCT had allotted a total of 13 permisos, but until 
2010 no other permission was granted.
19
 Nonetheless, the process of negotiations about 
legalization has opened the position of the Mexican government towards community media. 
                                               
17 Interview with AMARC Mexico leading staff, 24 August 2006; transl. by the author. 
18 See Zocalo, January 2004; 2SCT comienza guerra de baja intensidad contra radios comunitarias; cierra tres. 
19 The details of a complicated application process and delays during the handling and allocation are adventurous 
and are described in full in Calleja & Solis 2005: 117-233. Calleja and Solis were actively involved in the 
process (Calleja as representative of AMARC Mexico) and delivered a protocol and detailed account of the 
operation in their book. 
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At the annual meeting of CIRT in 2004, Santiago Creel, then head of SEGOB and anticipated 
future presidential candidate of PAN, underlined the fundamental right of all societal groups 
and communities – and not indigenous groups only – to their own means of communication: 
 
“ (T)he execution of the new rules will have to consider that societal groups and 
communities have, without doubt, the right to use – always within the law – the 
technologies and the radioelectric spectrum to communicate; and has to decide on their 
specific needs of subsistence and development when granting the same opportunities to all 
Mexicans. When such solicitations [permisos for community radios] cater to real social 
needs and confirm the will and capacity to place oneself within the legal framework, they 
cannot be seen as threats to the broadcasting industry, but as expressions that are part of 
our new reality.”20 
 
The more lenient position of the government has, from 2006 to 2009, neither been transferred 
into granting any more permissions, nor has the Broadcasting Law been altered accordingly. 
In 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the Federal Telecommunications Commission 
COFETEL, and not the Ministry SCT, the competent authority to grant and withdraw 
concessions. COFETEL approved six permission applications from community radios in 
January 2010. According to AMARC, the 19 legalized community stations with broadcasting 
permissions represent less than one per cent of the frequencies that commercial and state 
media operate.
21
 The granting of permissions case by case, however, cannot remedy the non-
existence of community radios in the Broadcasting Law. It is an administrative act, an 
interpretation of a deficient regulation, which still leaves community radios without formal 
legal entitlement. Accordingly, AMARC formulated Principles on Democratic Regulation of 
Community Broadcasting in 2008, stressing legal recognition and promotion, the reservation 
of frequencies for community media use, and open, transparent and public licensing 
procedures with non-discriminatory requirements and conditions.
22
 
Between 2000 and 2010, two diametrically opposed reform initiatives have addressed the 
issue of community media: the so-called Televisa Law of 2006, which was declared 
unconstitutional in many of its sections and invalidated in 2007, and an integral reform of 
broadcasting regulation, under discussion since 2008. 
 
 
Televisa Law 2006 
 
The term “Televisa Law” refers to a reform of selected articles of both the Broadcasting Law 
and the Telecommunications Law, which did not address any of the regulatory deficits 
prevalent in the Mexican legal framework, but unilaterally privileged the dominant players of 
both industries in the convergence and digitalization process. Among other modifications, the 
reform granted commercial broadcasting concessions to the incumbent concessionaires for 20 
years, distributed digital concessions at no cost to established commercial media outlets and 
provided for a distribution of new concessions according to the principle of the highest bidder. 
The „reform‟ process scandalized many groups: non-commercial media outlets (TV, radio and 
print), civil society groups and media activists. The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill 
                                               
20 Calleja & Solis 2005: 126 
21 AMARC Press release February 3, 2010; http://www.amarcmexico.org/comunicados/3086.html 
22 World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters: Principles on Democratic Regulation of Community 
Broadcasting; May 3, 2008 
http://legislaciones.amarc.org/Principios/Principles%20on%20Democratic%20Regulation%20of%20Community
%20Broadcasting%20(eng).pdf 
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unanimously ten days after its introduction, after seven minutes of discussion and without any 
changes to its first draft. Despite the protests, the bill also passed the Senate with large 
majorities. The success of the reform, however, cannot be attributed to a large and 
overarching policy consensus among the parties, but to the presidential and general elections 
of 2006, in which all parties perceived the need to secure support from the dominant media 
outlets, who had intensely pressed for this reform.
23
 By prioritizing vote-seeking interests 
over their policy preferences, legislators and parties enabled a reform that became most 
notorious of what it did not contain: 
 
- Community media was not included and acknowledged as a legal entity; 
- The process of acquiring permissions and resources for community media was not 
mentioned in the Broadcasting Law and remained discretional and arbitrary; 
- Allotting the digital spectrum to incumbent commercial concessionaires left state-, 
public and community media out of digitalization processes; 
- Non-commercial media would be effectively hindered in their development, without 
assigned resources and cut off from technological developments. 
 
Because 47 Senators filed a complaint of unconstitutionality (some of these Senators had 
previously voted in favor under pressure from their parties), the Constitutional Court revised 
and eventually invalidated central parts of the reform. Nevertheless, the Televisa Law posed a 
great challenge to the legalization process of community radios and represents a massive step 
backwards on Mexico‟s way towards a more open, inclusive and democratic media 
legislation. 
 
 
Towards an Integral Reform: 2007-2010 
 
Installed after the Constitutional Court‟s rejection of the Televisa Law reform in 2007, a 
Senate commission drafted a new integral media reform. In the following months, the 
commission consulted different groups of stakeholders, including CIRT.
24
 The final initiative, 
which is still being discussed in the Mexican parliament (as of June 2010), combined the 
Radio and Television Law of 1960 and the Telecommunications Law of 1995, as the previous 
reform had already attempted. The contents of the reform project, the prospective “Federal 
Law of Telecommunications and Audiovisual Contents” promises a thorough overhaul of the 
deficient media regulation, introducing consumer and citizen‟s communication rights, opening 
the market for new actors and competition, setting concentration limits and allowing foreign 
investment in the media and telecommunication market. With regard to community media, the 
reform proposed to finally provide a legal standard: 
 
- Abolition of the previous distinction between commercial “concessions” and 
“permissions”:  
- Concessions to be granted for commercial use, social use, public use and private use 
- Community media may apply for a concession of social use; indigenous communities 
enjoy a separate and easier application procedure 
                                               
23
 For a detailed analysis of the reform process see Klinger (2011). 
24 See Alonso, Roberto (2010). Respuesta a CIRT y llamado al Congreso, In La Jornada del Oriente, April 21, 
2010 www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/2010/04/21/puebla/medieros14.php   
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- Community media as social media will not receive direct public financial transfers; 
financial resources may come from sponsoring, donations and/or limited 
advertisement 
 
The conflict between the dominant broadcasters represented in CIRT and other media actors 
from state, public and alternative broadcasters continues in the new legislative process. CIRT 
strongly opposes the reform initiative: 
 
“The proposed initiative stands in every aspect in contrast to our Constitutional Article 6, 
which protects the freedom of expression, because it proposes a new legal framework that 
is characteristic of authoritarian regimes, that contravenes the rule of law and abolishes 
the legal certainty of an industry, which has guaranteed the freedom of expression and 
diversity of ideas. (…) We (commercial) broadcasters manifest our discontent with the 
possibility, that the back may be turned on an industry and its communicators and 
workers, who have been a key factor in the democratic development in Mexico for 
decades.” (CIRT Statement of April 19, 2010)25 
 
The reform does indeed go against the business interests of the broadcasting industries` 
oligopoly, since it abolishes traditional privileges and intends to stimulate competition. The 
representatives of community media, like AMARC, urge the prompt implementation of the 
reform, which still has to pass both parliamentary chambers.
26
 The PAN and the PRD – the 
two former opposition parties located at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, have 
teamed up on behalf of the project. In the mid-term elections of 2009, the PAN lost its 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, where PAN and PRD together hold 43 per cent of the 
mandates; in the Senate PAN holds 50, and the PRD 26 seats out of 128. Thus, the prospects 
are not bad for Mexican community radios to become legal media actors, more than 40 years 
after their first transmissions. 
 
 
Comparative Focus: Community Radio and its legal Frameworks in Latin 
America 
 
In addition to the human rights frame that AMARC applied to the debate about legalizing 
community media in Mexico, they also pointed to legislative improvements in other Latin 
American countries, demonstrating the belatedness of Mexican democratization in media 
regulation and the international as well as regional isolation of the Mexican government on 
this issue. In fact, the struggle for legalization has not been limited to Mexico, but has been 
negotiated in several Latin American countries in the wake of the wave of democratization, 
which the continent has experienced from the 1990s on. However, many of the new 
broadcasting or community media regulations have been passed since 2000, as states revised 
their media laws in response to the advent of convergence and digitalization. 
 
 
Bolivia 
 
                                               
25CIRT:  http://www.cirt.com.mx/cirt/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=792, <Rev. 
20.05.2010> 
26 See AMARC Press Statements, as „AMARC-Mexico urge a la Aprobacion de una reforma integral de los 
medios“ of April 22, 2010 http://www.amarcmexico.org/comunicados/3099.html?print, <Rev. 20.05.2010> 
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In 2005 the Bolivian government under President Carlos Mesa Gisbert introduced a 
Regulation of Community Broadcasting, which in 2007 was replaced by the Regulation of 
Telecommunication Services in Rural Areas (Decreto Supremo 29174). As indicated in its 
title, the law defines community media as broadcasters, which are directed at and operated by 
organized communities (campesino, indigenous, municipalities or private initiatives 
representative of those communities) and are located in rural areas, i.e. locations with a 
population under 10,000. It excludes certain groups and individuals from obtaining 
broadcasting licenses for community radios, such as functionaries of political parties or 
political institutions, individuals linked to commercial broadcasters, groups or individuals 
operating other community radios, priests and other functionaries of the church. The access to 
licenses, and the conditions to enter the application process are listed in detail and are 
transparent. Community radios have to transmit at least five hours per day and follow content 
guidelines: educational and cultural programs, programs dealing with local public problems 
and reserved airtime for direct participation of community members are among the criteria 
listed in the decree (Art. 36 a-g). 
 
 
Colombia 
 
Community radios in Colombia are regulated by Decree number 1981, implemented in 2003. 
Here, community media may be rural or urban, but have to be operated by legal persons or 
organizations that reside in the area of transmission. The law gives a detailed account of 
normative objectives and program guidelines and provides an authoritative list of conditions 
and procedures to obtain a broadcasting license. Columbian community stations may receive 
financial resources from governmental institutions, but also from sponsors, donors or 
international organizations (those which are legally recognized in Colombia). Commercial 
advertisement as income source is allowed up to 15 minutes per hour. However, AMARC and 
Reporters Without Borders reported in May 2010 that the local and regional economy is so 
affected by the Colombian conflict that it cannot provide an effective source of income, so 
that community radios operate at the verge of depletion.
27
 Besides economic consequences, 
the ongoing violent conflict between paramilitaries, guerillas and the Colombian armed forces 
drastically limit the possibilities of coverage of local issues and incidents, as well as the 
cultural objectives stated in the law: indigenous languages cannot be spoken, fostered and 
preserved on air, as both guerilla and military insist on exclusively Spanish transmissions.
28
 
The election campaign of 2010 has raised discussions about Article 6 of the Community 
Radio Law, which prohibits political advertisement and propaganda to be aired in this type of 
media. 
 
 
Chile 
 
Chilean regulations were early in the recognition of community radios, in the General 
Telecommunications Law of 1982 (with modifications in 1994 and 1999), but imposed 
                                               
27
  Informe Asociación Mundial de Radios Comunitarias, América Latina y Caribe, AMARC ALC; Misión 
Libertad de Expresión Colombia 10-16 de mayo 2010; 
http://legislaciones.item.org.uy/files/REPORTE%20FINAL%20COLOMBIA%20AMARC%20ALC-
28052010.pdf 
28 http://legislaciones.item.org.uy/files/REPORTE%20FINAL%20COLOMBIA%20AMARC%20ALC-
28052010.pdf, p.5 
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various limitations to the operations of community radios. Similar to Brazil, where 
community radios may air only within one a one-kilometer radius, Chilean rules restricted 
transmission power to one watt. After more than two years of negotiations and intensive 
conflict between the National Association of Community Radios (ANARCICH) and the 
Association of Radiobroadcasters (ARCHI), Chilean legislators passed a new Law of 
Community Citizens Radio Services in April 2010. ANARCICH embraced the new 
regulation, underlining that it “brings better legal and technical conditions for the 
development of our stations, who have awaited this moment for many years.”29 Instead of 
only one watt, radios are entitled to 25 watt transmissions; indigenous communities to 30 
watts and stations in remote areas to 40 watts; transmission antennas may rise 18 instead of 6 
meters; concessions have to be renewed every 10 instead of 3 years and community radios are 
allowed to broadcast commercials. Concessions are granted within a reserved segment of 
analogue frequencies (RM 105.9 to 107.9; FM 107.1 to 107.9). Critics of the reform have 
pointed to the small size of this segment, to the preferential renewal of concessions for 
previous operators at the cost of future applicants and the high fines for illegal radio stations. 
 
 
Argentina 
 
Argentine legislators passed a new media law, the so-called Ley de Servicios de 
Comunicación Audiovisual, in October 2009. It replaced the Broadcasting Law of 1980, 
which had been decreed by Jorge Videla and represented a centralist, discriminatory and 
authoritarian regulation. The new law recognized community media and introduced reserved 
frequencies for local broadcasters and non-profit organizations: each of the 23 provinces and 
the City of Buenos Aires reserve one AM, one FM and one open TV frequency; and every 
municipality one FM frequency. In addition, 33 per cent of planned radioelectric frequencies 
for radio and TV are to be distributed among civil society actors, defined as non-profit 
organizations. Indigenous communities are granted the right to install and operate radio and 
free TV. In municipalities with a university, one free TV and one radio frequency are reserved 
for educational, scientific or cultural broadcasting. However, the implementation of the law 
has been suspended, after three federal courts suspended some articles of the law. One verdict 
came in favor of Grupo Clarín, Argentina‟s largest commercial media group, and another in 
favor of a consumer protection interest group, which had filed lawsuits against the law. 
Meanwhile legislators and experts are debating questions about the jurisdiction of lower 
courts and their constitutional competence to suspend laws.
30
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Mexican case and other Latin American media reform processes illustrate the difficulties 
community media encounter on their way to legal recognition, and the delay of democratizing 
media regulations, while defective democracies are on their way to consolidation. In 
Argentina it took 26 years to replace the authoritarian media law of its military junta. The 
slow reform processes are embedded in the context of low reform capacity and an incapacity 
of Latin American states to formulate, implement and enforce rules and regulations. The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 placed Mexico 36 out of 128 transformation 
                                               
29 Cited in Mella (2010) 
30 http://legislaciones.item.org.uy/index?q=node/1207 
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countries in its Management Index, and criticized the comparatively low steering capability of 
legislators and executive:  
 
“What Mexico lacks at the present time is (…) reforms that might advance the 
consolidation of democracy or modify the structural deficits of the economic model in 
place since the 1980s. (…) In this respect things are advancing too slowly.“31 
 
Reform processes of outdated media legislation are further complicated by legislators, who 
form advocacy coalitions with dominant commercial media organizations and the 
broadcasting industry, in order to block regulation that aims at more pluralistic and open 
media systems – because these reform projects inevitably conflict with the highly 
concentrated commercial media industries` interests. 
 
However, in the past five years community media have scored first successes. In many Latin 
American countries the path towards legalization and entitlement to frequencies and resources 
has been opened. In Mexico, legislators and authorities are trapped in their ambiguous 
approaches between criminalization of community media and granting case-by-case 
permissions without a transparent legal basis. The future of community broadcasters and their 
capacity to perform crucial functions within local public spheres will hinge largely on the 
capacity of political actors to democratize to the regulatory framework for broadcasting in 
Mexico. 
 
With regard to democratic consolidation it can be underlined that the partial regime of 
political liberties and public arena is negatively affected by the politically and economically 
motivated exclusion of community broadcasters. As Lichtenberg (1987) has pointed out, 
freedom of the press does not entail a “right to publish”. However, as Merkel has argued, 
political communication rights are the institutional backbone of political liberties and the 
distribution and reception of public communication must not be restricted for political or 
economic motivations. Thus, the argument is not that a higher number of community 
broadcasters increases democratic quality, but that the broadcasting spectrum must be equally 
accessible to all actors, and access regulation therefore must be transparent, fair and enabling 
diversity. 
 
As has been pointed out above, the five partial regimes in the concept of embedded 
democracy are both independent of each other and interdependent on each other. This refers 
to different logics, actors and structures being at work in the different partial regimes. 
However, defects in one partial regime may trigger defects in other partial regimes. Political 
liberties depend on effective civil rights and the rule of law. The electoral regime and 
accountability mechanisms depend on a functioning public arena, in which interests are 
formulated, opinions discussed and where government responsiveness is evaluated. Thus, a 
defective political arena caused by politically motivated restricted political communication 
rights, negatively impacts election processes and electoral legitimacy. This in turn does not 
help the efforts of democratic consolidation. 
 
The future of Mexican democracy will certainly not entirely depend on the question of how 
and when community radios gain access to broadcasting licenses. Mexico is riddled with 
many severe democratic defects from deficient rule of law, low steering capability to the 
violent conflict between the state and non-state actors of violence involved in drug and human 
                                               
31 http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI2010/LAC/Mexico.pdf 
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trafficking. Democracy indices, Freedom House and such looking beyond electoral 
democracy (as Bertelsmann Transformation Index or Sustainable Government Indicators
32
), 
give record of the many problems that Mexican governments need to address.  However, the 
interdependence of partial regimes in democratic political systems illustrates that 
guaranteeing political communication rights is not a footnote of transformation processes, but 
a key issue that democratic reform needs to master. Community broadcasters may be small 
organizational units – the conditions under which they operate can serve as a litmus test of 
democratization progress. 
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